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Abstract: Reinforcement learning from self-play has recently reported many suc-
cesses. Self-play, where the agents compete with themselves, is often used to
generate training data for iterative policy improvement. In previous work, heuris-
tic rules are designed to choose an opponent for the current learner. Typical rules
include choosing the latest agent, the best agent, or a random historical agent.
However, these rules may be inefficient in practice and sometimes do not guar-
antee convergence even in the simplest matrix games. In this paper, we propose
a new algorithmic framework for competitive self-play reinforcement learning in
two-player zero-sum games. We recognize the fact that the Nash equilibrium co-
incides with the saddle point of the stochastic payoff function, which motivates us
to borrow ideas from classical saddle point optimization literature. Our method
trains several agents simultaneously, and intelligently takes each other as opponent
based on simple adversarial rules derived from a principled perturbation-based
saddle optimization method. We prove theoretically that our algorithm converges
to an approximate equilibrium with high probability in convex-concave games
under standard assumptions. Beyond the theory, we further show the empirical
superiority of our method over baseline methods relying on the aforementioned
opponent-selection heuristics in matrix games, grid-world soccer, Gomoku, and
simulated robot sumo, with neural net policy function approximators.
Keywords: self-play, policy optimization, two-player zero-sum game, multiagent
1 Introduction
Reinforcement learning (RL) from self-play has drawn tremendous attention over the past few years.
Empirical successes have been observed in several challenging tasks, including Go [1, 2, 3], simu-
lated hide-and-seek [4], simulated sumo wrestling [5], Capture the Flag [6], Dota 2 [7], StarCraft II
[8], and poker [9], to name a few. During RL from self-play, the learner collects training data by
competing with an opponent selected from its past self or an agent population. Self-play presumably
creates an auto-curriculum for the agents to learn at their own pace. At each iteration, the learner
always faces an opponent that is comparably in strength to itself, allowing continuous improvement.
The way the opponents are selected often follows human-designed heuristic rules in prior works. For
example, AlphaGo [1] always competes with the latest agent, while the later generation AlphaGo
Zero [2] and AlphaZero [3] generate self-play data with the maintained best historical agent. In
specific tasks, such as OpenAI’s sumo wrestling environment, competing against a randomly chosen
historical agent leads to the emergence of more diverse behaviors [5] and more stable training than
against the latest agent [10]. In population-based training [6, 11] and AlphaStar [8], an elite or
random agent is picked from the agent population as the opponent.
Unfortunately, these rules may be inefficient and sometimes ineffective in practice and do not nec-
essarily enjoy convergence guarantee to the “average-case optimal” solution even in tabular matrix
games. In fact, in the simple Matching Pennies game, self-play with the latest agent fails to converge
and falls into an oscillating behavior, as shown in Sec. 5.
In this paper, we want to develop an algorithm that adopts a principally-derived opponent-selection
rule to alleviate some of the issues mentioned above. This requires clarifying first what the solution
of self-play RL should be. From the game-theoretical perspective, Nash equilibrium is a funda-
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mental solution concept that characterizes the desired “average-case optimal” strategies (policies).
When each player assumes other players also play their equilibrium strategies, no one in the game
can gain more by unilaterally deviating to another strategy. Nash, in his seminal work [12], has
established the existence result of mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of any finite game. Thus solving
for a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is a reasonable goal of self-play RL.
We consider the particular case of two-player zero-sum games, a reasonable model for the competi-
tive environments studied in the self-play RL literature. In this case, the Nash equilibrium is the same
as the (global) saddle point and as the solution of the minimax program minx∈X maxy∈Y f(x, y).
We denote x, y as the strategy profiles (in RL language, policies) and f as the loss for x or util-
ity/reward for y. A saddle point (x∗, y∗) ∈ X × Y , where X,Y are the sets of all possible mixed-
strategies (stochastic policies) of the two players, satisfies the following key property
f(x∗, y) ≤ f(x∗, y∗) ≤ f(x, y∗), ∀x ∈ X,∀y ∈ Y. (1)
Connections to the saddle point problem and game theory inspire us to borrow ideas from the abun-
dant literature for finding saddle points in the optimization field [13, 14, 15, 16] and for finding equi-
librium in the game theory field [17, 18, 19]. One particular class of method, i.e., the perturbation-
based subgradient methods to find the saddles [14, 15], is especially appealing. This class of method
directly builds upon the inequality properties in Eq. 1, and has several advantages: (1) Unlike some
algorithms that require knowledge of the game dynamic [1, 2, 20], it requires only subgradients;
thus, it is easy to adapt to policy optimization with estimated policy gradients. (2) It is guaranteed
to converge in its last iterate instead of an average iterate, hence alleviates the need to compute any
historical averages as in [18, 19, 17], which can get complicated when neural nets are involved [21].
(3) Most importantly, it prescribes a simple principled way to adversarially choose opponents, which
can be naturally implemented with a concurrently-trained agent population.
To summarize, we adapt the perturbation-based methods of classical saddle point optimization into
the model-free self-play RL regime. This results in a novel population-based policy gradient method
for competitive self-play RL described in Sec. 3. Analogous to the standard model-free RL setting,
we assume only “naive” players [22] where the game dynamic is hidden and only rewards for their
own actions are revealed. This enables broader applicability than many existing algorithms [1, 2, 20]
to problems with mismatched or unknown game dynamics, such as many real-world or simulated
robotic problems. In Sec. 4, we provide an approximate convergence theorem of the proposed algo-
rithm for convex-concave games as a sanity check. Sec. 5 shows extensive experiment results favor-
ing our algorithm’s effectiveness on several games, including matrix games, a game of grid-world
soccer, a board game, and a challenging simulated robot sumo game. Our method demonstrates
better per-agent sample efficiency than baseline methods with alternative opponent-selection rules.
Our trained agents can also outperform the agents trained by other methods on average.
2 Related Work
Reinforcement learning trains a single agent to maximize the expected return through interacting
with an environment [23]. Multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL), where two-agent is a spe-
cial case, concerns multiple agents taking actions in the same environment [24]. Self-play is a
training paradigm to generate data for learning in MARL and has led to great successes, achieving
superhuman performance in many domains [25, 1, 9]. Applying RL algorithms naively as indepen-
dent learners in MARL sometimes produces strong agents [25], but often does not converge to the
equilibrium. People have studied ways to extend RL algorithms to MARL, e.g., minimax-Q [24],
Nash-Q [26], WoLF-PG [27], etc. However, most of these methods are designed for tabular RL
only therefore not readily applicable to continuous state action spaces and complex policy functions
where gradient-based policy optimization methods are preferred. Very recently, there is some work
on the non-asymptotic regret analysis of tabular self-play RL [28]. While our work roots from a
practical sense, these work enrich the theoretical understanding and complement ours.
There are algorithms developed from the game theory and online learning perspective [29, 20, 30],
notably Tree search, Fictitious self-play [18] and Regret minimization [22, 17], and Mirror descent
[31, 32]. Tree search such as minimax and alpha-beta pruning is particularly effective in small-state
games. Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) is also effective in Go [1]. However, Tree search requires
learners to know the exact game dynamics. The latter ones typically require maintaining some
historical quantities. In Fictitious play, the learner best responds to a historical average opponent,
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and the average strategy converges. Similarly, the total historical regrets in all (information) states
are maintained in (counterfactual) regret minimization [17]. The extragradient rule in [31] is a
special case of the adversarial perturbation we rely on in this paper. Most of those algorithms are
designed only for discrete state action environments. Special care has to be taken with neural net
function approximators [21]. On the contrary, our method enjoys last-iterate convergence under
proper convex-concave assumptions, does not require the complicated computation of averaging
neural nets, and is readily applicable to continuous environments through policy optimization.
In two-player zero-sum games, the Nash equilibrium coincides with the saddle point. This enables
the techniques developed for finding saddle points. While some saddle-point methods also rely
on time averages [16], a class of perturbation-based gradient method is known to converge under
mild convex-concave assumption for deterministic functions [15, 14, 33]. We develop an efficient
sampling version of them for stochastic RL objectives, which leads to a more principled and effective
way of choosing opponents in self-play. Our adversarial opponent-selection rule bears a resemblance
to [34]. However, the motivation of our work (and so is our algorithm) is to improve self-play RL,
while [34] aims at attacking deep self-play RL policies. Though the algorithm presented here builds
upon policy gradient, the same framework may be extended to other RL algorithms such as MCTS
due to a recent interpretation of MCTS as policy optimization [35]. Finally, our way of leveraging
Eq. 1 in a population may potentially work beyond gradient-based RL, e.g., in training generative
adversarial networks similarly to [33] because of the same minimax formulation.
3 Method
Classical game theory defines a two-player zero-sum game as a tuple (X,Y, f) where X,Y are
the sets of possible strategies of Players 1 and 2 respectively, and f : X × Y 7→ R is a mapping
from a pair of strategies to a real-valued utility/reward for Player 2. The game is zero-sum (fully
competitive), and Player 1’s reward is −f .
We consider mixed strategies (corresponding to stochastic policies in RL). In the discrete case, X
and Y could be all probability distributions over the sets of actions. When parameterized function
approximators are used, X,Y can be the spaces of all policy parameters.
Multiagent RL formulates the problem as a Stochastic Game [36], an extension to Markov Decision
Processes (MDP). Denote at as the action of Player 1 and bt as the action of Player 2 at time t, let T
be the time limit of the game, then the stochastic payoff f writes as
f(x, y) = E at∼pix,bt∼piy,
st+1∼P (·|st,at,bt)
 T∑
t=0
γtr(st, at, bt)
 . (2)
The state sequence {st}Tt=0 follows a transition dynamic P (st+1|st, at, bt). Actions are sampled ac-
cording stochastic policies pix(·|st) and piy(·|st). And r(st, at, bt) is the reward (payoff) for Player
2 at time t, determined jointly by the state and actions. We use the term ‘agent’ and ‘player’ inter-
changeably. In deep RL, x and y are the policy neural net parameters. In some cases [1], we can
enforce x = y by sharing parameters if the game is impartial or we do not want to distinguish them.
The discounting factor γ weights short and long term rewards and is optional. Note that when one
agent is fixed - taking y as an example - the problem x is facing reduces to an MDP, if we define a
new state transition dynamic Pnew(st+1|st, at) =
∑
bt
P (st+1|st, at, bt)piy(bt|st) and a new reward
rnew(st, at) =
∑
bt
r(st, at, bt)piy(bt|st).
The naive algorithm provably works in strictly convex-concave games (where f is strictly convex
in x and strictly concave in y) under assumptions in [13]. However, in general, it does not enjoy
last-iterate convergence to the Nash equilibrium. Even for simple games such as Matching Pennies
and Rock Paper Scissors, as we shall see in our experiments, the naive algorithm generates cyclic
sequences of xk, yk that orbit around the equilibrium. This motivates us to study the perturbation-
based method that converges under weaker assumptions.
Recall that the Nash equilibrium has to satisfy the saddle constraints Eq. 1: f(x∗, y) ≤ f(x∗, y∗) ≤
f(x, y∗). The perturbation-based method builds upon this property [16, 15, 14] and directly opti-
mize for a solution that meets the constraints. They find perturbed points u of x and v of y, and
use gradients at (x, v) and (u, y) to optimize x and y. Under some regularity assumptions, gradient
direction from a single perturbed point is adequate for proving convergence [16] for (not strictly)
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Algorithm 1: Perturbation-based self-play policy optimization of an n agent population.
Input: N : number of iterations, ηk: learning rates, mk: sample size, n: population size, l: number of inner
policy updates;
Result: n pairs of policies;
1 Initialize (x0i , y
0
i ), i = 1, 2, . . . n;
2 for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . N − 1 do
3 Evaluate fˆ(xki , y
k
j ), ∀i, j ∈ 1 . . . n with Eq. 4 and sample size mk;
4 for i = 1, . . . n do
5 Construct candidate opponent sets Ckyi = {ykj : j = 1 . . . n} and Ckxi = {xkj : j = 1 . . . n};
6 Find perturbed vki = argmaxy∈Ckyi
fˆ(xki , y), perturbed u
k
i = argminx∈Ckxi
fˆ(x, yki );
7 Invoke a single-agent RL algorithm (e.g., A2C, PPO) on xki for l times that:
8 Estimate policy gradients gˆkxi = ∇ˆxf(xki , vki ) with sample size mk (e.g., Eq. 5);
9 Update policy by xk+1i ← xki − ηkgˆkxi (or RmsProp);
10 Invoke a single-agent RL algorithm (e.g., A2C, PPO) on yki for l times that:
11 Estimate policy gradients gˆkyi = ∇ˆyf(uki , yki ) with sample size mk;
12 Update policy by yk+1i ← yik + ηkgˆkyi (or RmsProp);
13 return {(xNi , yNi )}ni=1;
convex-concave functions. They can be easily extended to accommodate gradientbased policy opti-
mization and stochastic RL objective Eq. 4.
We propose to find the perturbations from an agent population, resulting in the algorithm outlined
in Alg. 1. The algorithm trains n pairs of agents simultaneously. The n2 pairwise competitions are
run as the evaluation step (Alg. 1 Line 3), costing n2mk trajectories. To save sample complexity,
we may use these rollouts to do one policy update as well. Then a simple adversarial rule (Eq. 3) is
adopted in Alg. 1 Line 6 to choose the opponents adaptively. The intuition is that vki and u
k
i are the
most challenging opponents in the population that the current xi and yi are facing.
vki = arg max
y∈Ckyi
fˆ(xki , y), u
k
i = arg min
x∈Ckxi
fˆ(x, yki ). (3)
The perturbations vki and u
k
i always satisfy f(x
k, vk) ≥ f(uk, yk), since maxy∈Ckyi fˆ(x
k
i , y) ≥
fˆ(xki , y
k
i ) ≥ minx∈Ckxi fˆ(x, y
k
i ). Then we run gradient descent on x
k
i with the perturbed v
k
i as
opponent to minimize f(xki , v
k
i ), and run gradient ascent on y
k to maximize f(uk, yk). Intuitively,
the duality gap between minx maxy f(x, y) and maxy minx f(x, y), approximated by f(xk, vk)−
f(uk, yk), is reduced, leading to (xk, yk) converging to the saddle point (equilibrium).
We build the candidate opponent sets in Line 5 of Alg. 1 simply as the concurrently-trained n-agent
population. Specifically,Ckyi =
{
yk1 , . . . , y
k
n
}
andCkxi =
{
xk1 , . . . , x
k
n
}
. This is due to the following
considerations. An alternative source of candidates is the fixed known agents such as a rule-based
agent, which may be unavailable in practice. Another source is the extragradient methods [14, 31],
where extra gradient steps are taken on y before optimizing x. The extragradient method can be
thought of as a local approximation to Eq. 3 with a neighborhood candidate opponent set, and thus
related to our method. However, this method could be less efficient because the trajectory sample
used in the extragradient estimation is wasted as it does not contribute to actually optimizing y. Yet
another source could be the past agents. This choice is motivated by Fictitious play and ensures that
the current learner always defeats a past self. But, as we shall see in the experiment section, self-play
with a random past agent learns slower than our strategy. We expect all agents in the population in
our algorithm to be strong, thus provide stronger learning signals.
Finally, we use Monte Carlo estimates to compute the values and gradients of f . In the classical
game theory setting, the game dynamic and payoff are known, so it is possible to compute the exact
values and gradients of f(x, y). But this is a rather restricted setting. In model-free MARL, we
have to collect roll-out trajectories to estimate both the function values through policy evaluation
and gradients through Policy gradient theorem [23]. After collecting m independent trajectories
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{{(sit, ait, rit)}Tt=0}mi=1, we can estimate f(x, y) by
fˆ(x, y) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
T∑
t=0
γtrit. (4)
And given estimates Qˆx(s, a; y) to the state-action value function Q(s, a) (assuming an MDP with
y as a fixed opponent of x), we can construct an estimator for∇xf(x, y) (and similarly for∇yf ) by
∇ˆxf(x, y) ∝ 1
m
m∑
i=1
T∑
t=0
∇x log pix(ait|sit)Qˆx(sit, ait; y). (5)
4 Convergence Analysis
We establish an asymptotic convergence result in the Monte Carlo policy gradient setting in Thm. 2
for a variant of Alg. 1 under regularity assumptions. This algorithm variant sets l = 1 and uses the
vanilla SGD as the policy optimizer. We add a stop criterion fˆ(xki , v
k)− fˆ(uk, yki ) .  after Line 6
with an accuracy parameter . The full proof can be found in the supplementary. Since the algorithm
is symmetric between agents in the population, we drop the subscript i for text clarity.
Assumption 1. X,Y ⊆ Rd are compact sets. As a consequence, there exists D s.t ∀x1, x2 ∈
X, ‖x1 − x2‖1 ≤ D and ∀y1, y2 ∈ Y, ‖y1 − y2‖1 ≤ D. Cky , Ckx are compact subsets of X and Y .
Further, assume f : X × Y 7→ R is a bounded convex-concave function.
Theorem 1 (Convergence with exact gradients [15]). Under A1, assume a sequence (xk, yk) →
(xˆ, yˆ) ∧ f(xk, vk)− f(uk, yk)→ 0 implies (xˆ, yˆ) is a saddle point, Alg. 1 (replacing all estimates
with true values) produces a sequence of points
{
(xk, yk)
}∞
k=0
convergent to a saddle.
The above case with exact sub-gradients is easy since both f and ∇f are deterministic. In RL
setting, we construct estimates for f(x, y) (Eq. 4) and∇xf,∇yf (Eq. 5) with samples. The intuition
is that, when the samples are large enough, we can bound the deviation between the true values and
estimates by concentration inequalities, then the proof outline similar to [15] also goes through.
Thm. 2 requires an extra assumption on the boundedness of Qˆ and gradients. By showing the policy
gradient estimates are approximate sub-/super-gradients of f , we are able to prove that the output
(xNi , y
N
i ) of Alg. 1 is an approximate Nash equilibrium with high probability.
Assumption 2. The Q value estimation Qˆ is unbiased and bounded by R, and the policy has
bounded gradient ‖∇ log piθ(a|s)‖∞ ≤ B.
Theorem 2 (Convergence with policy gradients). Under A1, A2, let sample size at step k be mk ≥
Ω
(
R2B2D2
2 log
d
δ2−k
)
and learning rate ηk = α Eˆk−2‖gˆkx‖2+‖gˆky‖2 with 0 ≤ α ≤ 2, then with probability
at least 1−O(δ), the Monte Carlo version of Alg. 1 generates a sequence of points {(xk, yk)}∞
k=0
convergent to an O()-approximate equilibrium (x¯, y¯), that is ∀x ∈ X,∀y ∈ Y, f(x, y¯) − O() ≤
f(x¯, y¯) ≤ f(x¯, y) +O().
Discussion. The theorems require f to be convex in x and concave in y, but not strictly. This is
a weaker assumption than Arrow-Hurwicz-Uzawa’s [13]. The purpose of this simple analysis is
mainly a sanity check and an assurance of the correctness of our method. It applies to the setting in
Sec. 5.1 but not beyond, as the assumptions do not necessarily hold for neural networks. The sample
size is chosen loosely as we are not aiming at a sharp finite sample complexity or regret analysis.
In practice, we can find empirically suitable mk (sample size) and ηk (learning rates), and adopt a
modern RL algorithm with an advanced optimizer (e.g., PPO [37] with RmsProp [38]) in place of
the SGD updates.
5 Experiments
We empirically evaluate our algorithm on several games with distinct characteristics. The imple-
mentation is based on PyTorch. Code, details, and demos are in the supplementary material.
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Compared methods. In Matrix games, we compare to a naive mirror descent method, which is
essentially Self-play with the latest agent. In the rest of the environments, we compare the results of
the following methods:
1. Self-play with the latest agent (Arrow-Hurwicz-Uzawa). The learner always competes
with the most recent agent. This is essentially the Arrow-Hurwicz-Uzawa method [13] or
the naive mirror/alternating descent.
2. Self-play with the best past agent. The learner competes with the best historical agent
maintained. The new agent replaces the best agent if it beats the previous one. This is the
scheme in AlphaGo Zero and AlphaZero [2, 3].
3. Self-play with a random past agent (Fictitious play). The learner competes against a
randomly sampled historical opponent. This is the scheme in OpenAI sumo [5, 10]. It
is similar to Fictitious play [18] since uniformly random sampling is equivalent to histor-
ical average by definition. However, Fictitious play only guarantees convergence of the
average-iterate but not the last-iterate agent.
4. OURS(n = 2, 4, 6, . . .). This is our algorithm with a population of n pairs of agents trained
simultaneously, with each other as candidate opponents. Implementation can be distributed.
Evaluation protocols. We mainly measure the strength of agents by the Elo scores [39]. Pairwise
competition results are gathered from a large tournament among all the checkpoint agents of all
methods after training. Each competition has multiple matches to account for randomness. The
Elo scores are computed by logistic regression, as Elo assumes a logistic relationship P (A wins) +
0.5P (draw) = 1/(1+10
RB−RA
400 ). A 100 Elo difference corresponds to roughly 64% win-rate. The
initial agent’s Elo is calibrated to 0. Another way to measure the strength is to compute the average
rewards (win-rates) against other agents. We also report average rewards in the supplementary.
5.1 Matrix games
We verified the last-iterate convergence to Nash equilibrium in several classical two-player zero-
sum matrix games. In comparison, the vanilla mirror descent/ascent is known to produce oscillating
behaviors [31]. Payoff matrices (for both players separated by comma), phase portraits, and error
curves are shown in Tab. 1,2,3,4 and Fig. 1,2,3,4. Our observations are listed beside the figures.
We studied two settings: (1) OURS(Exact Gradient), the full information setting, where the players
know the payoff matrix and compute the exact gradients on action probabilities; (2) OURS(Policy
Gradient), the reinforcement learning or bandit setting, where each player only receives the reward of
its own action. The action probabilities were modeled by a probability vector p ∈ ∆2. We estimated
the gradient w.r.t p with the REINFORCE estimator [40] with sample size mk = 1024, and applied
ηk = 0.03 constant learning rate SGD with proximal projection onto ∆2. We trained n = 4 agents
jointly for Alg. 1 and separately for the naive mirror descent under the same initialization.
5.2 Grid-world soccer game
We conducted experiments in a grid-world soccer game. Similar games were adopted in [41, 24].
Two players compete in a 6 × 9 grid world, starting from random positions. The action space is
{up, down, left, right, noop}. Once a player scores a goal, it gets positive reward 1.0, and the game
ends. Up to T = 100 timesteps are allowed. The game ends with a draw if time runs out. The game
has imperfect information, as the two players move simultaneously.
The policy and value functions were parameterized by simple one-layer networks, consisting of
a one-hot encoding layer and a linear layer that outputs the action logits and values. The logits
are transformed into probabilities via softmax. We used Advantage Actor-Critic (A2C) [42] with
Generalized Advantage Estimation (GAE) [43] and RmsProp [38] as the base RL algorithm. The
hyper-parameters are N = 50, l = 10, mk = 32 for Alg. 1. We kept track of the per-agent number
of trajectories (episodes) each algorithm uses for fair comparison. Other hyper-parameters are in the
supplementary. All methods were run multiple times to calculate the confidence intervals.
In Fig. 5, OURS(n = 2, 4, 6) all perform better than others, achieving higher Elo scores after experi-
encing the same number of per-agent episodes. Other methods fail to beat the rule-based agent after
32000 episodes. Competing with a random past agent learns the slowest, suggesting that, though
it may stabilize training and lead to diverse behaviors [5], the learning efficiency is not as high be-
cause a large portion of samples is devoted to weak opponents. Within our methods, the performance
increases with a larger n, suggesting a larger population may help find better perturbations.
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Game payoff matrix Phase portraits and error curves
Heads Tails
Heads 1,−1 −1, 1
Tails −1, 1 1,−1
Table 1: Matching Pennies, a classical game where
two players simultaneously turn their pennies to
heads or tails. If the pennies match, Player 2
wins one penny from 1; otherwise, Player 1 wins.
(Px(head), Py(head)) =
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
is the unique Nash
equilibrium with game value 0.
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Figure 1: Matching Pennies. (Top) The phase
portraits. (Bottom) The squared L2 distance to
the equilibrium. Four colors correspond to 4
agents in the population.
Heads Tails
Heads 2,−2 0, 0
Tails −1, 1 2,−2
Table 2: Skewed Matching Pennies.
Observation: In the leftmost column of Fig. 1,2,
the naive mirror descent does not converge (point-
wisely); instead, it is trapped in a cyclic behav-
ior. The trajectories of the probabilities of playing
Heads orbit around the Nash, showing as circles in
the phase portrait. On the other hand, our method
enjoys approximate last-iterate convergence with
both exact and policy gradients.
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Figure 2: Skewed Matching Pennies. The
unique Nash equ. is (Px(heads), Py(heads)) =(
3
5
, 2
5
)
with value 0.8.
Rock Paper Scissors
Rock 0, 0 −1, 1 1,−1
Paper 1,−1 0, 0 −1, 1
Scissors −1, 1 1,−1 0, 0
Table 3: Rock Paper Scissors.
Observation: Similar observations occur in
the Rock Paper Scissors (Fig. 3). The naive
method circles around the corresponding equi-
librium points
(
3
5 ,
2
5
)
and
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
, while our
method converges.
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Figure 3: Rock Paper Scissors. (Top) Visual-
ization of Player 1’s strategies of one agent P0
from the population. (Down) The squared dis-
tance to equilibrium.
a b c
A 1,−1 −1, 1 0.5,−0.5
B −1, 1 1,−1 −0.5, 0.5
Table 4: Extended Matching Pennies.
Observation: Our method has the benefit of pro-
ducing diverse solutions when there exist multi-
ple Nash equilibria. The solution for row player
is x =
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
, while any interpolation between(
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0
)
and
(
0, 13 ,
2
3
)
is an equilibrium column
strategy. Depending on initialization, agents in
our method converges to different equilibria.
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Figure 4: Visualization of Player 2’s strategies.
(Left) Exact gradient; (Right) Policy gradient.
The dashed line represents possible equilibrium
strategies. The four agents (in different colors)
of the population in our algorithm (n = 4) con-
verge differently.
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Figure 5: Soccer Elo curves av-
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Figure 6: Gomoku Elo curves av-
eraged over 10 runs for the base-
line methods, 6 runs (12 agents) for
OURS(n = 2), 4 runs (16 agents)
for OURS(n = 4), and 3 runs (18
agents) for OURS(n = 6).
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Figure 7: RoboSumo Ants Elo
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the baseline methods, 2 runs for
OURS(n = 4, 8). A close-up is also
drawn for better viewing.
* In all three figures, bars show the 95% confidence intervals. We compare per-agent sample efficiency.
5.3 Gomoku board game
We investigated the effectiveness in the Gomoku game, which is also known as Renju, Five-in-a-row.
In our variant, two players place black or white stones on a 9-by-9 board in turn. The player who
gets an unbroken row of five horizontally, vertically, or diagonally, wins (reward 1). The game is a
draw (reward 0) when no valid move remains. The game is sequential and has perfect information.
This experiment involved much more complex neural networks than before. We adopted a 4-layer
convolutional ReLU network (kernels (5, 5, 3, 1), channels (16, 32, 64, 1), all strides 1) for both
the policy and value networks. Gomoku is hard to train from scratch with pure model-free RL
without explicit tree search. Hence, we pre-trained the policy nets on expert data collected from
renjuoffline.com. We downloaded roughly 130 thousand games and applied behavior cloning.
The pre-trained networks were able to predict expert moves with ≈ 41% accuracy and achieve an
average score of 0.93 (96% win and 4% lose) against a random-action player. We adopted the A2C
[42] with GAE [43] and RmsProp with learning rate ηk = 0.001. Up to N = 40 iterations of Alg. 1
were run. The other hyperparameters are the same as those in the soccer game.
In Fig. 6, all methods are able to improve upon the behavior cloning policies significantly.
OURS(n = 2, 4, 6) demonstrate higher sample efficiency by achieving higher Elo ratings than the
alternatives given the same amount of per-agent experience. This again suggests that the opponents
are chosen more wisely, resulting in better policy improvements. Lastly, the more complex policy
and value functions (multi-layer CNN) do not seem to undermine the advantage of our approach.
5.4 RoboSumo Ants
Our last experiment is based on the RoboSumo simulation environment in [10, 5], where two Ants
wrestle in an arena. This setting is particularly relevant to practical robotics research, as we believe
success in this simulation could be transferred into the real-world. The Ants move simultaneously,
trying to force the opponent out of the arena or onto the floor. The physics simulator is MuJoCo
[44]. The observation space and action space are continuous. This game is challenging since it
involves a complex continuous control problem with sparse rewards. Following [10, 5], we utilized
PPO [37] with GAE [43] as the base RL algorithm, and used a 2-layer fully connected network with
width 64 for function approximation. Hyper-parameters N = 50, mk = 500. In [10], a random past
opponent is sampled in self-play, corresponding to the “Self-play w/ random past” baseline here.
The agents are initialized from imitating the pre-trained agents of [10]. We consider n = 4 and
n = 8 in our method. From Fig. 7, we observe again that OURS(n = 4, 8) outperform the baseline
methods by a statistical margin and that our method benefits from a larger population size.
6 Conclusion
We propose a new algorithmic framework for competitive self-play policy optimization inspired by
a perturbation subgradient method for saddle points. Our algorithm provably converges in convex-
concave games and achieves better per-agent sample efficiency in several experiments. In the future,
we hope to study a larger population size (should we have sufficient computing power) and the
possibilities of model-based and off-policy self-play RL under our framework.
8
References
[1] D. Silver, A. Huang, C. J. Maddison, A. Guez, L. Sifre, G. Van Den Driessche, J. Schrittwieser,
I. Antonoglou, V. Panneershelvam, M. Lanctot, et al. Mastering the game of go with deep
neural networks and tree search. Nature, 529(7587):484, 2016. 1, 2, 3
[2] D. Silver, J. Schrittwieser, K. Simonyan, I. Antonoglou, A. Huang, A. Guez, T. Hubert,
L. Baker, M. Lai, A. Bolton, et al. Mastering the game of go without human knowledge.
Nature, 550(7676):354, 2017. 1, 2, 6
[3] D. Silver, T. Hubert, J. Schrittwieser, I. Antonoglou, M. Lai, A. Guez, M. Lanctot, L. Sifre,
D. Kumaran, T. Graepel, et al. A general reinforcement learning algorithm that masters chess,
shogi, and go through self-play. Science, 362(6419):1140–1144, 2018. 1, 6
[4] B. Baker, I. Kanitscheider, T. Markov, Y. Wu, G. Powell, B. McGrew, and I. Mordatch. Emer-
gent tool use from multi-agent autocurricula. In International Conference on Learning Repre-
sentations, 2020. 1
[5] T. Bansal, J. Pachocki, S. Sidor, I. Sutskever, and I. Mordatch. Emergent complexity via multi-
agent competition. ICLR, 2017. 1, 6, 8
[6] M. Jaderberg, W. Czarnecki, I. Dunning, L. Marris, G. Lever, A. Castaneda, C. Beattie, N. Ra-
binowitz, A. Morcos, A. Ruderman, et al. Human-level performance in 3d multiplayer games
with population-based reinforcement learning. Science, 364(6443):859–865, 2019. 1
[7] C. Berner, G. Brockman, B. Chan, V. Cheung, P. Debiak, C. Dennison, D. Farhi, Q. Fischer,
S. Hashme, C. Hesse, et al. Dota 2 with large scale deep reinforcement learning. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1912.06680, 2019. 1
[8] O. Vinyals, I. Babuschkin, W. M. Czarnecki, M. Mathieu, A. Dudzik, J. Chung, D. H. Choi,
R. Powell, T. Ewalds, P. Georgiev, et al. Grandmaster level in starcraft ii using multi-agent
reinforcement learning. Nature, 575(7782):350–354, 2019. 1
[9] N. Brown and T. Sandholm. Superhuman ai for multiplayer poker. Science, 365(6456):885–
890, 2019. 1, 2
[10] M. Al-Shedivat, T. Bansal, Y. Burda, I. Sutskever, I. Mordatch, and P. Abbeel. Continuous
adaptation via meta-learning in nonstationary and competitive environments. In International
Conference on Learning Representations, 2018. 1, 6, 8
[11] S. Liu, G. Lever, J. Merel, S. Tunyasuvunakool, N. Heess, and T. Graepel. Emergent coordi-
nation through competition. ICLR, 2019. 1
[12] J. Nash. Non-cooperative games. Annals of mathematics, pages 286–295, 1951. 2
[13] K. J. Arrow, H. Azawa, L. Hurwicz, and H. Uzawa. Studies in linear and non-linear program-
ming, volume 2. Stanford University Press, 1958. 2, 3, 5, 6
[14] G. Korpelevich. The extragradient method for finding saddle points and other problems. Mate-
con, 12:747–756, 1976. 2, 3, 4
[15] M. Kallio and A. Ruszczynski. Perturbation methods for saddle point computation. 1994. 2,
3, 5, 14, 15
[16] A. Nedic´ and A. Ozdaglar. Subgradient methods for saddle-point problems. Journal of opti-
mization theory and applications, 2009. 2, 3
[17] M. Zinkevich, M. Johanson, M. Bowling, and C. Piccione. Regret minimization in games
with incomplete information. In Advances in neural information processing systems, pages
1729–1736, 2008. 2, 3
[18] G. W. Brown. Iterative solution of games by fictitious play. Activity analysis of production and
allocation, 13(1):374–376, 1951. 2, 6
[19] S. Singh, M. Kearns, and Y. Mansour. Nash convergence of gradient dynamics in general-sum
games. UAI, 2000. 2
[20] A. Nowe´, P. Vrancx, and Y.-M. De Hauwere. Game theory and multi-agent reinforcement
learning. Reinforcement Learning, page 441, 2012. 2
[21] J. Heinrich and D. Silver. Deep reinforcement learning from self-play in imperfect-information
games. arXiv:1603.01121, 2016. 2, 3
[22] A. Jafari, A. Greenwald, D. Gondek, and G. Ercal. On no-regret learning, fictitious play, and
nash equilibrium. ICML, 2001. 2
9
[23] R. Sutton and A. Barto. reinforcement learning: an introduction. MIT press, 2018. 2, 4
[24] M. L. Littman. Markov games as a framework for multi-agent reinforcement learning. In
Machine Learning, pages 157–163. Elsevier, 1994. 2, 6
[25] G. Tesauro. Temporal difference learning and td-gammon. Communications of the ACM, 38
(3):58–68, 1995. 2
[26] J. Hu and M. P. Wellman. Nash q-learning for general-sum stochastic games. JMLR, 4(Nov):
1039–1069, 2003. 2
[27] M. Bowling and M. Veloso. Multiagent learning using a variable learning rate. Artificial
Intelligence, 136(2):215–250, 2002. 2
[28] Y. Bai and C. Jin. Provable self-play algorithms for competitive reinforcement learning. arXiv
preprint arXiv:2002.04017, 2020. 2
[29] M. Lanctot, V. Zambaldi, A. Gruslys, A. Lazaridou, K. Tuyls, J. Pe´rolat, D. Silver, and T. Grae-
pel. A unified game-theoretic approach to multiagent reinforcement learning. In Advances in
neural information processing systems, pages 4190–4203, 2017. 2
[30] A. R. Cardoso, J. Abernethy, H. Wang, and H. Xu. Competing against nash equilibria in
adversarially changing zero-sum games. In International Conference on Machine Learning,
pages 921–930, 2019. 2
[31] P. Mertikopoulos, H. Zenati, B. Lecouat, C.-S. Foo, V. Chandrasekhar, and G. Piliouras. Opti-
mistic mirror descent in saddle-point problems: Going the extra (gradient) mile. ICLR, 2019.
2, 3, 4, 6
[32] S. Rakhlin and K. Sridharan. Optimization, learning, and games with predictable sequences.
In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 3066–3074, 2013. 2
[33] J. Hamm and Y.-K. Noh. K-beam minimax: Efficient optimization for deep adversarial learn-
ing. ICML, 2018. 3
[34] A. Gleave, M. Dennis, C. Wild, N. Kant, S. Levine, and S. Russell. Adversarial policies:
Attacking deep reinforcement learning. In International Conference on Learning Representa-
tions, 2019. 3
[35] J.-B. Grill, F. Altche´, Y. Tang, T. Hubert, M. Valko, I. Antonoglou, and R. Munos. Monte-carlo
tree search as regularized policy optimization. ICML, 2020. 3
[36] L. S. Shapley. Stochastic games. PNAS, 39(10):1095–1100, 1953. 3
[37] J. Schulman, F. Wolski, P. Dhariwal, A. Radford, and O. Klimov. Proximal policy optimization
algorithms. arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.06347, 2017. 5, 8
[38] G. Hinton, N. Srivastava, and K. Swersky. Neural networks for machine learning lecture 6a
overview of mini-batch gradient descent. 5, 6
[39] A. E. Elo. The rating of chessplayers, past and present. Arco Pub., 1978. 6
[40] R. J. Williams. Simple statistical gradient-following algorithms for connectionist reinforce-
ment learning. Machine learning, 8(3-4):229–256, 1992. 6
[41] H. He, J. Boyd-Graber, K. Kwok, and H. Daume´ III. Opponent modeling in deep reinforcement
learning. ICML, 2016. 6
[42] V. Mnih, A. P. Badia, M. Mirza, A. Graves, T. Lillicrap, T. Harley, D. Silver, and
K. Kavukcuoglu. Asynchronous methods for deep reinforcement learning. In ICML, pages
1928–1937, 2016. 6, 8
[43] J. Schulman, P. Moritz, S. Levine, et al. High-dimensional continuous control using general-
ized advantage estimation. ICLR, 2016. 6, 8
[44] E. Todorov, T. Erez, and Y. Tassa. Mujoco: A physics engine for model-based control. In
2012 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems, pages 5026–
5033. IEEE, 2012. 8
10
A Experiment details
A.1 Illustrations of the games in the experiments
Illustration Properties
A
B
Figure 8: Illustration of the 6x9 grid-world
soccer game. Red and blue represent the
two teams A and B. At start, the players
are initialized to random positions on re-
spective sides, and the ball is randomly
assigned to one team. Players move up,
down, left and right. Once a player scores a
goal, the corresponding team wins and the
game ends. One player can intercept the
other’s ball by crossing the other player.
Observation:
Tensor of shape [5, ],
(xA, yA, xB , yB , A has
ball)
Action:
{up, down, left, right, noop}
Time limit:
50 moves
Terminal reward:
+1 for winning team
−1 for losing team
0 if timeout
A B C D E F G H I
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1 39
4 6
28
7
5
1011
12
13
Figure 9: Illustration of the Gomoku game
(also known as Renju, five-in-a-row). We
study the 9x9 board variant. Two players
sequentially place black and white stones
on the board. Black goes first. A player
wins when he or she gets five stones in a
row. In the case of this illustration, the
black wins because there is five consecu-
tive black stones in the 5th row. Numbers
in the stones indicate the ordered they are
placed.
Observation:
Tensor of shape [9, 9, 3],
last dim 0: vacant, 1:
black, 2: white
Action:
Any valid location on the
9x9 board
Time limit:
41 moves per-player
Terminal reward:
+1 for winning player
−1 for losing player
0 if timeout
Figure 10: Illustration of the RoboSumo
Ants game. Two ants fight in the arena.
The goal is to push the opponent out of
the arena or down to the floor. Agent po-
sitions are initialized to be random at the
start of the game. The game ends in a
draw if the time limit is reached. In ad-
dition to the terminal ±1 reward, the envi-
ronment comes with shaping rewards (mo-
tion bonus, closeness to opponent, etc.). In
order to make the game zero-sum, we take
the difference between the original rewards
of the two ants.
Observation:
R120
Action:
R8
Time limit:
100 moves
Reward:
rt = r
orig y
t − rorig xt
Terminal ±1 or 0.
A.2 Hyper-parameters
The hyper-parameters in different games are listed in Tab. 5.
A.3 Additional results
Win-rates (or average rewards). Here we report additional results in terms of the average win-
rates, or equivalently the average rewards through the linear transform win-rate = 0.5 + 0.5 reward,
in Tab. 6 and 7. Since we treat each (xi, yi) pair as one agent, the values are the average of f(xi, ·)
and f(·, yi) in the first table. The one-side f(·, yi) win-rates are in the second table. Mean and 95%
11
Table 5: Hyper-parameters.
Hyper-param \ Game Soccer Gomoku RoboSumo
Num. of iterations N 50 40 50
Learning rate ηk 0.1
0 → 0.001 in first
20 steps then 0.001 3e-5→ 0 linearly
Value func learning rate (Same as above.) (Same as above.) 9e-5
Sample size mk 32 32 500
Num. of inner updates l 10 10 10
Env. time limit 50 41 per-player 100
Base RL algorithm A2C A2C PPO, clip 0.2, mini-batch 512, epochs 3
Optimizer RmsProp, α = 0.99 RmsProp, α = 0.99 RmsProp, α = 0.99
Max gradient norm 1.0 1.0 0.1
GAE λ parameter 0.95 0.95 0.98
Discounting factor γ 0.97 0.97 0.995
Entropy bonus coef. 0.01 0.01 0
Policy function
Sequential[
OneHot[5832],
Linear[5832,5],
Softmax,
CategoricalDist ]
Sequential[
Conv[c16,k5,p2],
ReLU,
Conv[c32,k5,p2],
ReLU,
Conv[c64,k3,p1],
ReLU,
Conv[c1,k1],
Spatial Softmax,
CategoricalDist ]
Sequential[
Linear[120,64],
TanH,
Linear[64,64],
TanH,
Linear[64,8],
TanH,
GaussianDist ]
Tanh ensures the mean
of the Gaussian is be-
tween -1 and 1. The
density is corrected.
Value function
Sequential[
OneHot[5832],
Linear[5832,1] ]
Share 3 Conv layers
with the policy, but
additional heads:
global average and
Linear[64,1]
Sequential[
Linear[120,64],
TanH,
Linear[64,64],
TanH,
Linear[64,1] ]
confidence intervals are estimated from multiple runs. Exact numbers of runs are in the captions
of Fig. 5,6,7 of the main paper. The message is the same as that suggested by the Elo scores: Our
method consistently produces stronger agents. We hope the win-rates may give better intuition about
the relative performance of different methods.
Training time. Thanks to the easiness of parallelization, the proposed algorithm enjoys good scal-
ability. We can either distribute the n agents into n processes to run concurrently, or make the roll-
outs parallel. Our implementation took the later approach. In the most time-consuming RoboSumo
Ants experiment, with 30 Intel Xeon CPUs, the baseline methods took approximately 2.4h, while
Ours (n=4) took 10.83h to train (×4.5 times), and Ours (n=8) took 20.75h (×8.6 times). Note that,
Ours (n) trains n agents simultaneously. If we train n agents with the baseline methods by repeating
the experiment n times, the time would be 2.4n hours, which is comparable to Ours (n).
Chance of selecting the agent itself as opponent. One big difference between our method and the
compared baselines is the ability to select opponents adversarially from the population. Consider the
agent pair (xi, yi). When training xi, our method finds the strongest opponent (that incurs the largest
loss on xi) from the population, whereas the baselines always choose (possibly past versions of) yi.
Since the candidate set contains yi, the “fall-back” case is to use yi as opponent in our method. We
report the frequency that yi is chosen as opponent for xi (and xi for yi likewise). This gives a sense
of how often our method falls back to the baseline method. From Tab. 8, we can observe that, as n
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Table 6: Average win-rates (∈ [0, 1]) between the last-iterate (final) agents trained by different
algorithms. Last two rows further show the average over other last-iterate agents and all other agents
(historical checkpoint) included in the tournament, respectively. Since an agent consists of an (x, y)
pair, the win-rate is averaged on x and y, i.e., win(col vs row) = f(x
row,ycol)−f(xcol,yrow)
2 × 0.5 + 0.5.
The lower the better within each column; The higher the better within each row.
(a) Soccer
Soccer Self-play latest Self-play best Self-play rand Ours (n=2) Ours (n=4) Ours (n=6)
Self-play latest - 0.533± 0.044 0.382± 0.082 0.662± 0.054 0.691± 0.029 0.713± 0.032
Self-play best 0.467± 0.044 - 0.293± 0.059 0.582± 0.042 0.618± 0.031 0.661± 0.030
Self-play rand 0.618± 0.082 0.707± 0.059 - 0.808± 0.039 0.838± 0.028 0.844± 0.043
Ours (n=2) 0.338± 0.054 0.418± 0.042 0.192± 0.039 - 0.549± 0.022 0.535± 0.022
Ours (n=4) 0.309± 0.029 0.382± 0.031 0.162± 0.028 0.451± 0.022 - 0.495± 0.023
Ours (n=6) 0.287± 0.032 0.339± 0.030 0.156± 0.043 0.465± 0.022 0.505± 0.023 -
Last-iter average 0.357± 0.028 0.428± 0.028 0.202± 0.023 0.532± 0.023 0.608± 0.018 0.585± 0.022
Overall average 0.632± 0.017 0.676± 0.014 0.506± 0.020 0.749± 0.009 0.775± 0.006 0.776± 0.008
(b) Gomoku
Gomoku Self-play latest Self-play best Self-play rand Ours (n=2) Ours (n=4) Ours (n=6)
Self-play latest - 0.523± 0.026 0.462± 0.032 0.551± 0.024 0.571± 0.018 0.576± 0.017
Self-play best 0.477± 0.026 - 0.433± 0.031 0.532± 0.024 0.551± 0.018 0.560± 0.020
Self-play rand 0.538± 0.032 0.567± 0.031 - 0.599± 0.027 0.588± 0.022 0.638± 0.020
Ours (n=2) 0.449± 0.024 0.468± 0.024 0.401± 0.027 - 0.528± 0.015 0.545± 0.017
Ours (n=4) 0.429± 0.018 0.449± 0.018 0.412± 0.022 0.472± 0.015 - 0.512± 0.013
Ours (n=6) 0.424± 0.017 0.440± 0.020 0.362± 0.020 0.455± 0.017 0.488± 0.013 -
Last-iter average 0.455± 0.010 0.479± 0.011 0.407± 0.012 0.509± 0.010 0.537± 0.008 0.560± 0.008
Overall average 0.541± 0.004 0.561± 0.004 0.499± 0.005 0.583± 0.004 0.599± 0.003 0.615± 0.003
(c) RoboSumo
RoboSumo Self-play latest Self-play best Self-play rand Ours (n=4) Ours (n=8)
Self-play latest - 0.502± 0.012 0.493± 0.013 0.511± 0.011 0.510± 0.010
Self-play best 0.498± 0.012 - 0.506± 0.014 0.514± 0.008 0.512± 0.010
Self-play rand 0.507± 0.013 0.494± 0.014 - 0.508± 0.011 0.515± 0.011
Ours (n=4) 0.489± 0.011 0.486± 0.008 0.492± 0.011 - 0.516± 0.008
Ours (n=8) 0.490± 0.010 0.488± 0.010 0.485± 0.011 0.484± 0.008 -
Last-iter average 0.494± 0.006 0.491± 0.005 0.492± 0.006 0.500± 0.005 0.514± 0.005
Overall average 0.531± 0.004 0.527± 0.004 0.530± 0.004 0.539± 0.003 0.545± 0.003
Table 7: Average one-sided win-rates (∈ [0, 1]) between the last-iterate (final) agents trained by
different algorithms. The win-rate is one-sided, i.e., win(ycol vs xrow) = f(xrow, ycol) × 0.5 + 0.5.
The lower the better within each column; The higher the better within each row.
(a) Soccer
row x \ col y Self-play latest Self-play best Self-play rand Ours (n=2) Ours (n=4) Ours (n=6)
Self-play latest 0.536± 0.054 0.564± 0.079 0.378± 0.103 0.674± 0.080 0.728± 0.039 0.733± 0.048
Self-play best 0.497± 0.065 0.450± 0.064 0.306± 0.106 0.583± 0.056 0.601± 0.039 0.642± 0.050
Self-play rand 0.614± 0.163 0.719± 0.090 0.481± 0.102 0.796± 0.071 0.816± 0.039 0.824± 0.062
Ours (n=2) 0.350± 0.051 0.419± 0.057 0.181± 0.049 0.451± 0.037 0.525± 0.031 0.553± 0.034
Ours (n=4) 0.346± 0.046 0.365± 0.047 0.140± 0.034 0.427± 0.034 0.491± 0.020 0.494± 0.033
Ours (n=6) 0.308± 0.042 0.319± 0.052 0.136± 0.050 0.483± 0.043 0.505± 0.030 0.515± 0.032
Last-iter average 0.381± 0.033 0.422± 0.036 0.188± 0.028 0.525± 0.029 0.601± 0.021 0.587± 0.026
Overall average 0.654± 0.017 0.665± 0.016 0.502± 0.021 0.745± 0.010 0.771± 0.006 0.775± 0.009
(b) Gomoku
row x \ col y Self-play latest Self-play best Self-play rand Ours (n=2) Ours (n=4) Ours (n=6)
Self-play latest 0.481± 0.031 0.540± 0.038 0.488± 0.050 0.594± 0.041 0.571± 0.026 0.586± 0.030
Self-play best 0.494± 0.033 0.531± 0.030 0.471± 0.049 0.597± 0.040 0.562± 0.024 0.572± 0.028
Self-play rand 0.565± 0.036 0.605± 0.036 0.572± 0.051 0.668± 0.040 0.617± 0.027 0.647± 0.029
Ours (n=2) 0.491± 0.031 0.533± 0.033 0.470± 0.040 0.568± 0.035 0.571± 0.022 0.552± 0.025
Ours (n=4) 0.428± 0.022 0.461± 0.024 0.440± 0.035 0.515± 0.029 0.491± 0.017 0.503± 0.020
Ours (n=6) 0.435± 0.021 0.453± 0.026 0.370± 0.028 0.462± 0.025 0.479± 0.018 0.467± 0.017
Last-iter average 0.472± 0.012 0.506± 0.014 0.438± 0.017 0.549± 0.016 0.550± 0.011 0.564± 0.012
Overall average 0.548± 0.005 0.585± 0.005 0.536± 0.007 0.631± 0.006 0.608± 0.004 0.617± 0.004
(c) RoboSumo
row x \ col y Self-play latest Self-play best Self-play rand Ours (n=4) Ours (n=8)
Self-play latest 0.516± 0.022 0.494± 0.020 0.491± 0.023 0.502± 0.017 0.511± 0.016
Self-play best 0.489± 0.018 0.504± 0.023 0.503± 0.022 0.506± 0.014 0.509± 0.014
Self-play rand 0.505± 0.021 0.491± 0.026 0.494± 0.026 0.518± 0.017 0.516± 0.014
Ours (n=4) 0.480± 0.018 0.479± 0.012 0.502± 0.016 0.496± 0.009 0.517± 0.012
Ours (n=8) 0.491± 0.012 0.484± 0.016 0.485± 0.016 0.486± 0.012 0.491± 0.012
Last-iter average 0.489± 0.008 0.485± 0.008 0.495± 0.009 0.500± 0.007 0.514± 0.007
Overall average 0.528± 0.004 0.521± 0.004 0.530± 0.005 0.534± 0.003 0.544± 0.003
13
grows larger, the chance of fall-back is decreased. This is understandable since a larger population
means larger candidate sets and a larger chance to find good perturbations.
Table 8: Average frequency of using the agent itself as opponent, in the Soccer and Gomoku ex-
periments. The frequency is calculated by counting over all agents and iterations. The ± shows the
standard deviations estimated by 3 runs with different random seeds.
Method Ours (n = 2) Ours (n = 4) Ours (n = 6)
Frequency of self (Soccer) 0.4983± 0.0085 0.2533± 0.0072 0.1650± 0.0082
Frequency of self (Gomoku) 0.5063± 0.0153 0.2312± 0.0111 0.1549± 0.0103
B Proofs
We adopt the following variant of Alg. 1 in our asymptotic convergence analysis. For clarity, we
investigate the learning process of one agent in the population and drop the i index. Ckx and C
k
y are
not set simply as the population for the sake of the proof. Alternatively, we pose some assumptions.
Setting them to the population as in the main text may approximately satisfy the assumptions.
Algorithm 2: Simplified perturbation-based self-play policy optimization of one agent.
Input: ηk: learning rates, mk: sample size;
Result: Pair of policies (x, y);
1 Initialize x0, y0;
2 for k = 0, 1, 2, . . .∞ do
3 Construct candidate opponent sets Cky and Ckx ;
4 Find perturbed vk = argmaxy∈Cky fˆ(x
k, y) and perturbed uk = argminx∈Ckx fˆ(x, y
k) where the
evaluation is done with Eq. 4 and sample size mk ;
5 Compute estimated duality gap Eˆk = fˆ(xk, vk)− fˆ(uk, yk);
6 if Eˆk ≤ 3 then
7 return (xk, yk)
8 Estimate policy gradients gˆkx = ∇ˆxf(xk, vk) and gˆky = ∇ˆyf(uk, yk) w/ Eq. 5 and sample size mk;
9 Update policy parameters with xk+1 ← xk − ηkgˆkx and yk+1 ← yk + ηkgˆky ;
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We restate the assumptions and the theorem here more clearly for reference.
Assumption B.1. X,Y ⊆ Rd (d > 1) are compact sets. As a consequence, there exists D ≥ 1, s.t.,
∀x1, x2 ∈ X, ‖x1 − x2‖1 ≤ D and ∀y1, y2 ∈ Y, ‖y1 − y2‖1 ≤ D.
Further, assume f : X × Y 7→ R is a bounded convex-concave function.
Assumption B.2. Cky , Ckx are compact subsets of X and Y . Assume that a sequence (xk, yk) →
(xˆ, yˆ)∧f(xk, vk)−f(uk, yk)→ 0 for some vk ∈ Cky and uk ∈ Ckx implies (xˆ, yˆ) is a saddle point.
Theorem 1 (Convergence with exact gradients [15]). Under Assump. B.1,B.2, let the learning rate
satisfies
ηk <
Ek
‖gkx‖2 + ‖gky‖2
,
Alg. 2 (when replacing all estimates with true values) produces a sequence of points
{
(xk, yk)
}∞
k=0
convergent to a saddle point.
Assump. B.1 is standard, which is true if f is based on a payoff table and X,Y are probability
simplex as in matrix games, or if f is quadratic and X,Y are unit-norm vectors. Assump. B.2
is about the regularity of the candidate opponent sets. This is true if Cky , C
k
x are compact and
f(xk, vk) − f(uk, yk) = 0 only at a saddle point (uk, vk) ∈ Cky × Ckx . An trivial example would
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be Ckx = X,C
k
y = Y . Another example would be the proximal regions around x
k, yk. In practice,
Alg. 1 constructs the candidate sets from the population which needs to be adequately large and
diverse to satisfy Assump. B.2 approximately.
The proof is due to [15], which we paraphrase here.
Proof. We shall prove that one iteration of Alg. 2 decreases the distance between the current (xk, yk)
and the optimal (x∗, y∗). Expand the squared distance,
‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 ≤ ‖xk + ηkgkx − x∗‖2 = ‖xk − x∗‖2 + 2ηk〈gkx, xk − x∗〉+ η2k‖gkx‖2. (6)
From Assump. B.1, convexity of f(x, y) on x gives
〈gkx, xk − x∗〉 ≥ f(xk, vk)− f(x∗, vk) (7)
which yields
‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 ≤ ‖xk − x∗‖2 − 2ηk(f(xk, vk)− f(x∗, vk)) + η2k‖gkx‖2. (8)
Similarly for yk, concavity of f(x, y) on y gives
‖yk+1 − y∗‖2 ≤ ‖yk − y∗‖2 + 2ηk
(
f(uk, yk)− f(uk, y∗))+ η2k‖gkx‖2. (9)
Sum the two and notice the saddle point condition implies
f(x∗, vk) ≤ f(x∗, y∗) ≤ f(uk, y∗), (10)
we have
Wk+1 := ‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 + ‖yk+1 − y∗‖2
≤ ‖xk − x∗‖2 + ‖yk − y∗‖2
− 2ηk
(
f(xk, vk)− f(x∗, vk)− f(uk, yk) + f(uk, y∗)
)
+ η2k
(‖gkx‖2 + ‖gky‖2)
≤Wk − 2ηkEk + η2k
(‖gkx‖2 + ‖gky‖2).
(11)
If the learning rate satisfies ηk < Ek‖gkx‖2+‖gky‖2 , the sequence {Wk}
∞
k=0 is strictly decreasing unless
Ek = 0. Since Wk is bounded below by 0, therefore Ek → 0. Following from Assump. B.2, the
convergent point limk→∞(xk, yk) = (x∗, y∗) is a saddle point.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We restate the additional Assump. B.3 and the theorem here for reference. Assump. B.2 is replaced
by the following approximated version B.4.
Assumption B.3. The total return is bounded by R, i.e., |∑t γtrt| ≤ R. The Q value es-
timator Qˆ is unbiased and bounded by R (|Qˆ| ≤ R). And the policy has bounded gradient
max{‖∇ log piθ(a|s)‖∞, 1} ≤ B in terms of L∞ norm.
Assumption B.4. Cky , Ckx are compact subsets ofX and Y . Assume at iteration k, for some (xˆ, yˆ) ∈
X × Y ,
∀(u, v) ∈ Ckx × Cky , f(u, yˆ)−  ≤ f(xˆ, yˆ) ≤ f(xˆ, v) + 
implies
∀(u, v) ∈ X × Y, f(u, yˆ)−  ≤ f(xˆ, yˆ) ≤ f(xˆ, v) + ,
namely, (xˆ, yˆ) is an -approximate saddle point.
Theorem 2 (Convergence with policy gradients). Under Assump. B.1,B.3,B.4, let sample size at
step k be
mk ≥ 2R
2B2D2
2
log
2d
δ2−k
and, with 0 ≤ α ≤ 2, let the learning rate
ηk = α
Eˆk − 2
‖gˆkx‖2 + ‖gˆky‖2
.
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Then with probability at least 1−O(δ), the Monte Carlo version of Alg. 2 generates a sequence of
points
{
(xk, yk)
}∞
k=0
convergent to an O()-approximate equilibrium (x¯, y¯). That is
∀x ∈ X,∀y ∈ Y, f(x, y¯)−O() ≤ f(x¯, y¯) ≤ f(x¯, y) +O().
In the stochastic game (or reinforcement learning) setting, we construct estimates for f(x, y) (Eq. 4)
and policy gradients ∇xf,∇yf (Eq. 5) with samples. Intuitively speaking, when the samples are
large enough, we can bound the deviation between the true values and the estimates by concentration
inequalities, then the similar proof outline also goes through.
Let us first define the concept of -subgradient for convex functions and -supergradient for concave
functions. Then we calculate how many samples are needed for accurate gradient estimation in
Lemma 3 with high probability. With Lemma 3, we will be able to show that the Monte Carlo policy
gradient estimates are good enough to be -subgradients when sample size is large in Lemma 4.
Definition 1. An -subgradient of a convex function h : Rd 7→ R at x is g ∈ Rd that satisfies
∀x′, h(x′)− h(x) ≥ 〈g, x′ − x〉 − .
Similarly, an -supergradient of a concave function h : Rd 7→ R at x is g ∈ Rd that satisfies
∀x′, h(x′)− h(x) ≤ 〈g, x′ − x〉+ .
Lemma 3 (Policy gradient sample size). Consider x or y alone and treat the problem as MDP.
Suppose Assump. B.3 is satisfied. Then with independently collected
m ≥ 2R
2B2
2
log
2d
δ
trajectories
{
(sit, a
i
t, Qˆ
i
t)}Tt=0
}m
i=1
, the policy gradient estimate
∇̂f = 1
m
∑
i,t
∇ log piθ(ait|sit)Qˆit
is -close to the true gradient∇f with high probability, namely,
Pr
(‖∇̂f −∇f‖∞ ≤ ) ≥ 1− δ.
Proof. It directly follows from Hoeffding’s inequality and the union bound, since the range of each
sample point is bounded by RB and by the policy gradient theorem E∇̂f = ∇f .
Lemma 4 (Policy gradients are  sub-/super- gradients). Under Assump. B.1, the policy gradient
estimate ∇̂xf in Lemma 3 is an D-subgradient of f at x, i.e., for all x′ ∈ X ,
f(x′, y)− f(x, y) ≥ 〈∇̂xf, x′ − x〉 − D
with probability ≥ 1− δ. (And ∇̂yf is D-super-gradient for y.)
Proof. Apply the telescoping trick,
〈∇̂xf, x′ − x〉 = 〈∇̂xf −∇xf +∇xf, x′ − x〉
= 〈∇xf, x′ − x〉+ 〈∇̂xf −∇xf, x′ − x〉
≥ f(x′, y)− f(x, y) + 〈∇̂xf −∇xf, x′ − x〉.
(12)
With the sample size in Lemma 3, we know it holds that maxi |∇̂xf −∇xf |i ≤  with probability
≥ 1− δ. Hence, by Holder’s inequality, the last part satisfies
〈∇̂xf −∇xf, x′−x〉 ≥ −〈|∇̂xf −∇xf |, |x′−x|〉 ≥ −‖∇̂xf −∇xf‖∞‖x′−x‖1 ≥ −D. (13)
The proof of ∇̂yf being D-super-gradient for y is similar, hence omitted.
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Similarly for accurate function value evaluation, we have the following lemma on sample size, which
directly follows from Hoeffding’s inequality.
Lemma 5 (Evaluation sample size). Suppose Assump. B.3 holds. Then with independently collected
m ≥ 2R22 log 2δ trajectories
{
(sit, a
i
t, r
i
t)}Tt=0
}m
i=1
, the value estimate f̂ = 1m
∑
i,t γ
trt is -close to
the true gradient f with high probability, namely, Pr
(‖f̂ − f‖∞ ≤ ) ≥ 1− δ.
Now we prove our main theorem which guarantees the output of Alg. 2 is an approximate Nash with
high probability. This is done by using Lemma 4 in place of the exact convexity condition to analyze
the relationship betweenWk andWk+1, using Lemma 5 to bound the error of policy evaluation, and
analyzing the stop condition carefully.
Proof. (Theorem 2.)
Suppose (x∗, y∗) is one saddle point of f . We shall prove that one iteration of Alg. 2 sufficiently
decreases the squared distance between the current (xk, yk) and (x∗, y∗) defined as Wk := ‖xk −
x∗‖2 + ‖yk − y∗‖2.
Relation between Wk and Wk+1:
Note that
Wk+1 = ‖xk+1−x∗‖2 ≤ ‖xk +ηkgˆkx−x∗‖2 = ‖xk−x∗‖2 + 2ηk〈gˆkx, xk−x∗〉+η2k‖gˆkx‖2. (14)
By Lemma 4, the gradient estimate gˆkx with sample sizemk is an -subgradient on xwith probability
at least 1− δ/2k, i.e.,
〈gˆkx, xk − x∗〉 ≥ f(xk, vk)− f(x∗, vk)− . (15)
Plugging back into Eq. 14, we get
‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 ≤ ‖xk − x∗‖2 − 2ηk
(
f(xk, vk)− f(x∗, vk)− 
)
+ η2k‖gkx‖2. (16)
Similarly for yk, since gˆkx is a super-gradient by Lemma 4,
‖yk+1 − y∗‖2 ≤ ‖yk − y∗‖2 + 2ηk
(
f(uk, yk)− f(uk, y∗) + 
)
+ η2k‖gkx‖2. (17)
Sum the two inequalities above, and notice the saddle point condition implies
f(x∗, vk) ≤ f(x∗, y∗) ≤ f(uk, y∗),
we have the following inequality holds with probability 1− 2δ/2k,
Wk+1 = ‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 + ‖yk+1 − y∗‖2
≤ ‖xk − x∗‖2 + ‖yk − y∗‖2
− 2ηk
(
f(xk, vk)− f(x∗, vk)− f(uk, yk) + f(uk, y∗)− 2)+ η2k(‖gˆkx‖2 + ‖gˆky‖2)
≤Wk − 2ηk(Ek − 2) + η2k
(‖gˆkx‖2 + ‖gˆky‖2).
(18)
Accurate estimation of Ek: In Eq. 18, the second term involves Ek which is unknown to the
algorithm. Recall that Ek(uk, vk) = f(xk, vk) − f(uk, yk) and the empirical estimate Eˆk =
fˆ(xk, vk)− fˆ(uk, yk) in Alg. 2 Line 5.
By Lemma 5, when the sample size mk is chosen as in Theorem 2, with probability 1− 2δd2k ,
|fˆ(xk, vk)− f(xk, vk)| ≤ 
BD
≤ 
and
|fˆ(uk, yk)− f(uk, yk)| ≤ 
BD
≤ .
Thus Eˆk is 2-accurate because
Eˆk − 2 = f(xk, vk)− − f(uk, yk)−  ≤ Ek
≤ f(xk, vk) + − f(uk, yk) +  = Eˆk + 2.
(19)
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Case (1). Stop condition in Alg. 2 Line 6: If there does not exist (u, v) ∈ Ckx × Cky such that
Eˆk(u, v) > 3, meaning ∀(u, v) ∈ Ckx × Cky , Eˆk ≤ 3. We can conclude
Ek = f(x
k, v)− f(u, yk) ≤ Eˆk + 3 = 5 (20)
with probability at least 1− 2δ
d2k
≥ 1− 2δ
2k
.
Set v = yk and u = xk respectively in the above inequality, we obtain ∀(u, v) ∈ Ckx × Cky ,
f(u, yk)− 5 ≤ f(xk, yk) ≤ f(xk, v) + 5. (21)
Following from Assump. B.4, this implies ∀(u, v) ∈ X×Y, f(u, yk)−5 ≤ f(xk, yk) ≤ f(xk, v)+
5, which suggests (xk, yk) is an approximate saddle point (equilibrium).
On the other hand, we want to bound the failure probability. Define events
F (g) := “|gˆ − g| ≤  is true”
for all g ∈ {g0x, g0y, f(x0, v0), f(u0, y0) . . . , gky , f(xk, yk) . . . }. By De Morgan’s law and the union
bound,
Pr
[
all MC estimates till step k are  accurate
]
= Pr
[ k⋂
l=0
F (glx) ∩ F (gly) ∩ F (f(xl, vl)) ∩ F (f(ul, yl))
]
= 1− Pr [ k⋃
l=1
F (glx) ∩ . . . ∩ F (f(ul, yl))
]
≥ 1−O( ∞∑
l=0
δ
2l
)
≥ 1−O(δ).
(22)
This means that inaccurate MC estimation (failure) occurs with small probabilityO(δ). The purpose
of the increasing mk w.r.t. k is to handle the union bound and the geometric series here. So, when
the algorithm stops, it returns (x¯, y¯) = (xk, yk) as a 5-approximate solution to the saddle point
(equilibrium) with high probability.
Case (2). Sufficient decrease of Wk: Otherwise, if the stop condition is not triggered, we have
picked uk, vk such that Eˆk > 3. With probability 1 − 2δ, Ek > Eˆk − 2 ≥ . With the chosen
learning rate ηk in the theorem statement, Wk strictly decreases by at least
Wk −Wk+1 > α(2− α)
2
‖gˆkx‖2 + ‖gˆky‖2
≥ α(2− α)
2
2R2B2
> 0. (23)
Since Wk is bounded below by 0, by the monotone convergence theorem, there exists a finite k
such that W0 ≤ kα(2−α)
2
2R2B2 , and no (u, v) can be found to decrease Wk more than 3. In this case,
∀(u, v) ∈ Ckx × Cky , Eˆk(u, v) ≤ 3, which is exactly the stop condition in Case (1). This means the
algorithm will eventually stop, and the proof is complete.
Remark 1. The sample size is chosen very loosely. More efficient ways to find perturbations (e.g.,
best-arm identification), to better characterize or cover the policy class and to better utilize trajec-
tories (e.g., especially off-policy evaluation w/ importance sampling) can potentially reduce sample
complexity. In practice, we found on-policy methods which do not reuse past experience such as
A2C and PPO work well enough.
Remark 2. Assump. B.4 is a rather strong assumption on the candidate opponent sets. In theory,
we can construct an -covering of f to satisfy the assumption. In practice, as in population-based
training of Alg. 1, this assumption can be roughly met if n is large or diverse enough. We found a
relatively small population with randomly initialized agents already brought noticeable benefit.
Remark 3. The proof requires a variable learning rate ηk. However, the intuition is that the learning
rate needs to be small, as we did in our experiments.
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